Belief consistency and trade consistency

Interpersonal consistency can be described in epistemic terms as a property of beliefs, or in economic terms as the impossibility of certain trades. The existence of a common prior from which all agentsʼ beliefs are derived is of the first kind. The non-existence of an agreeable bet, that is, a contingent zero-sum trade which is always favorable to all agents, is of the second kind. It is well established that these two notions of consistency are equivalent for finite type spaces but not for countable ones. We present three equivalences of epistemic consistency and economic consistency conditions for countable type spaces, defining in this way three levels of consistency of type spaces: weak consistency, consistency, and strong consistency. These three levels coincide in the finite case. We fully analyze the level of consistency of type spaces based on the knowledge structure of Rubinsteinʼs email game. The new notion of belief consistency introduced here helps to justify the requirement of boundedness of payoff functions in countable type spaces by showing that in a large class of spaces there exists an agreeable unbounded bet even when a common prior exists.     

Universal type structures with unawareness

Infinite hierarchies of awareness and beliefs arise in games with unawareness, similarly to belief hierarchies in standard games. A natural question is whether each hierarchy describes the playerʼs awareness of the hierarchies of other players and beliefs over these, or whether the reasoning can continue indefinitely. This paper constructs the universal type structure with unawareness where each type has an awareness level and a belief over types. Countable hierarchies are therefore sufficient to describe all uncertainty in games with unawareness.     

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjectsʼ belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjectsʼ eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjectsʼ beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to “update down” following unsuccessful choices, than “update up” following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of average earnings by subjects in this experiment) than what would be obtained from a fully-rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple “win-stay” choice heuristic.     

加强开展两课教育,提升大学生思想素质

思想政治教育在大学教育中非常重要,决定着学生未来成长的道路和做人的原则。"两课"教育的意义不在于要学生记住一定的理论知识,而在于引导形成学生正确的思想和价值观念。     

Robustly optimal monetary policy in a microfounded New Keynesian model

We consider optimal monetary stabilization policy in a New Keynesian model with explicit microfoundations, when the central bank recognizes that private-sector expectations need not be precisely model-consistent, and wishes to choose a policy that will be as good as possible in the case of any beliefs close enough to model-consistency. We show how to characterize robustly optimal policy without restricting consideration a priori to a particular parametric family of candidate policy rules. We show that robustly optimal policy can be implemented through commitment to a target criterion involving only the paths of inflation and a suitably defined output gap, but that a concern for robustness requires greater resistance to surprise increases in inflation than would be considered optimal if one could count on the private sector to have “rational expectations.”     

浅析信仰缺失后中国人的表现及重塑信仰的意义

改革开放30年间,我国经济飞速发展,同时信仰缺失问题也伴随而来。而本文主要议信仰缺失后我国人民的一些表现及重塑马克思主义信仰的意义。     

文化信仰与经济绩效——盐业中的徽商与宁波商

本文借鉴HCIA方法，尝试解释中国历史上著名的徽商的兴衰原因。分析具有强烈宗族文化的徽商如何在盐业竞争中脱颖而出，并形成相应的商业文化；并且以宁波商人（浙江商人的代表）为参照，比较说明宗族间“封闭”和“开放”的两种不同文化信仰在历史发展中的作用。在此基础上，本文强调文化的经济作用，强调在制度演化中文化的内生性，而不是仅仅作为一个外生的影响因素。     

On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provision of public projects

How do individuals' spatial decisions affect the institutions for public goods provision over time? This paper describes a dynamic model in which the provision mechanism for a public project is itself the object of locational choice of individuals. Individuals in an ongoing society must choose between a location with a Majority Rule mechanism and one with a Voluntary Contribution mechanism. Each mechanism determines a funding decision for a local public project which is repeated over time. Generations of individuals asynchronously supercede their ‘parents’, creating an entry/exit process that allows individuals with possibly different beliefs to enter society. A self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) belief process describes an evolution of beliefs in this society consistent with a self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine, 1993) of the repeated location/provision game. It is shown that the process with belief mutation as new individuals enter society results in a globally absorbing state in which the Majority Rule mechanism is the unique survivor of the two.     

消费者的CSR-CA观念及其对CSR与购买意向关系的影响研究

实证研究表明，在企业社会责任（CSR）与企业能力（CA）关系方面，绝大多数消费者持相互促进（Win—Win）观念而不是相互对立（Trade—off）观念。进一步研究显示，同样是持Win—Win观念的消费者，程度不同，对CSR与购买意向关系有不同的影响：持强CSR—CA相互促进观念的消费者与持弱CSR—CA相互促进观念的消费者对CSR水平较高和一般的企业生产的产品的购买意向没有显著差异，但对于CSR水平较低的企业生产的产品，前者的购买意向显著低于后者。     

An Analytical Model for External Auditor Evaluation of the Internal Audit Function Using Belief Functions

The purpose of this paper is to advance research in internal audit (IA) evaluation by developing an IA assessment model that considers interrelationships among specific factors used by external auditors to evaluate the strength of the IA function. The model is based on three factors identified by auditing standards and by prior academic research: Competence, Work Performance, and Objectivity. We develop an analytical expression of the model using the belief function framework in order to overcome limitations of prior research. Our results reveal that modeling the “And” relationship is essential for assessing the strength of the IA function. As far as interrelationships are concerned, the analysis shows that, when the three factors have a strong or a perfect relationship, the strength of the IA function remains high even if there is positive or negative evidence about one of the factors. This result holds as long as there are high levels of belief about the other two factors. Further, we demonstrate how the quality of corporate governance affects the evaluation of the IA function and how a cost–benefit analysis can be applied to this framework to help determine the amount of external audit work needed to comply with standards. Our analysis reveals that the extent of external audit work to be carried out by the external auditor depends on the strength of the IA function and the amount of litigation and regulatory costs likely to be faced by the external auditor.